

# Examining Simultaneous Election Models: A Comparative Analysis of International Practices and Their Applicability to the One Nation, One Election Framework in Indian Electoral Reform

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**Abstract:** This study examines the One Nation, One Election (ONOE) concept by contextualising global experiences for India's diverse federal landscape. By analysing electoral synchronisation models in major democracies such as the United States, Brazil, Germany, Indonesia, Sweden, and South Africa, the research uncovers a spectrum of administrative efficiencies, political outcomes, and challenges surrounding simultaneous elections. Drawing from empirical lessons and comparative frameworks, the paper scrutinises opportunities and hurdles specific to India—including federal autonomy, logistical demands, constitutional amendments, and the balancing of national and regional interests. The findings emphasise the need for a phased, adaptive reform strategy supported by technological upgrades, inclusive dialogue, and robust institutional safeguards to preserve India's electoral integrity and pluralism. Ultimately, this research provides a strategic, evidence-led roadmap for implementing ONOE, aiming to enhance governance efficiency, streamline costs, and strengthen India's democracy while respecting its rich diversity.

**Keywords:** ONOE, simultaneous election, democracy, electoral reform, electoral synchronisation.

**Introduction** - The foundation of democracy depends on the concept of election. Election in a working democracy is not only a mechanism to choose a candidate for the post, but also represents the consciousness of the people. It is simply not feasible to imagine a democratic order without a properly functioning electoral system. Hence, we can simply say that the election is the very soul of democracy. In its extensive federal structure, India, the largest democracy in the world, holds periodic elections with different electoral cycles for the Lok Sabha (the lower house of Parliament) and several state legislative assemblies. Due to the frequent elections at various governmental levels brought on by this fragmented electoral schedule, there is significant political instability, huge administrative expenses, and voter fatigue. Since governments focus more on electioneering than on long-term policy execution, frequent calls to the polls frequently interrupt the continuity of rule. Aiming to synchronise the dates of state and national elections for improved political stability, administrative effectiveness, and cost reduction, the concept of "One Nation One Election" (ONOE) has garnered increased interest in this context (Chadah, 2024; Kovind Committee, 2024; Brookings Institution, 2013).

To reduce the number of elections in the nation, ONOE suggests conducting polls for the Lok Sabha and all state

assemblies simultaneously. There are examples of this idea in several federal democracies that have implemented synchronised election cycles with different levels of success. However, there are particular opportunities and challenges for such reforms due to India's distinct socio-political fabric, which is marked by its great regional autonomy and wide spectrum (Rane & Nayak, 2025; Chadah, 2024). In India, it is not the first time the country has tried for One Nation One Election. The founding fathers were looking for this exact election model, i.e. simultaneous elections for state assembly and parliamentary polls when the nation gained its independence in 1947 (Chakraborty, 2024).

Examining experiences from around the world as well as India's particular political and constitutional circumstances, this paper examines carefully the idea of ONOE. Based on technological, constitutional, and policy changes, it examines the reform's advantages, possible disadvantages, feasibility, and strategic roadmap. This research attempts to add to the current conversation on election reforms and democratic strengthening in India by combining insights from other federal democracies and considering India's democratic culture (Kovind Committee, 2024; Chadah, 2024).

## Review of Literature

Free and fair elections are regarded as essential to a valid

political system, and they continue to be the central component of democratic administration. Periodic elections, which represent the sovereign will of its diverse populace, are a fundamental component of India's democracy (Chadah, 2024). Constitutional measures that protect the electoral process from intervention and provide regular, transparent, and accountable governance highlight the fundamental significance of elections (Chadah, 2024). As India struggles with frequent elections at different levels of government, the debate regarding electoral reforms and the potential for simultaneous elections has heated up. According to Rane and Nayak (2025), these frequent polls cause significant administrative and budgetary strains, interfere with the continuity of governance, and exacerbate voter fatigue. The policy significance of this problem is demonstrated by the Indian government's adoption of the High-Level Committee's recommendations to investigate simultaneous elections, which were developed under former President Ram Nath Kovind (Chadah, 2024). Divergent opinions on the feasibility of ONOE have been expressed by academics and policymakers. Proponents argue that by reducing interruptions associated with the Model Code of Conduct, synchronised elections can improve administrative efficiency, increase political stability, and lower the prohibitive costs associated with holding numerous elections (Chadah, 2024). Many federal democracies throughout the world use this kind of synchronisation, which is seen as a way to expedite election management and governance cycles (Chadah, 2024).

On the other hand, critics highlight serious issues about ONOE's conformity to fundamental Indian democratic and federal ideals. The constitutional "agency contract" between the electorate and elected representatives may be broken if the terms of elected bodies are changed to coincide with elections, according to Rane and Nayak (2025), undermining the democratic will. The established idea of periodic accountability through elections, which is essential to India's democracy, could be weakened by extending or cutting tenure. Furthermore, by establishing strict election cycles that are incompatible with political realities, ONOE may weaken important democratic mechanisms, such as the legislature's capacity to test government confidence through no-confidence motions (Rane & Nayak, 2025).

One other significant issue is federalism. With specific powers granted to states, India's distinctive federal structure places a strong emphasis on state autonomy (Rane & Nayak, 2025). In violation of constitutional safeguards, forced election cycle alignment may restrict state autonomy and hinder state government operations. Additionally, concurrent elections might distort regional concerns in favour of national narratives, discouraging regional parties that are crucial for advancing a range of local interests throughout India's complex political landscape (Rane & Nayak, 2025). Political uniformity could result from this, diminishing the diversity and dynamism that characterise


Indian democracy (Chadah, 2024).

Legal experts also warn that although ONOE might be made possible by constitutional revisions, doing so runs the risk of violating the fundamental framework of the document, which upholds democratic and federal values (Rane & Nayak, 2025). One of the main issues in the discussion of simultaneous elections is the conflict between constitutional protections and institutional effectiveness. Overall, the literature offers a complex picture: even while ONOE has attractive administrative and financial advantages, its possible democratic and federal implications demand close examination. This dichotomy highlights the necessity for a fair, constitutionally sound approach to election reforms in India and informs the current scholarly and policy discussion.

#### **Different Models of Simultaneous Election:**

Simultaneous election is no new concept for the electoral democracies. Many countries throughout the world have, in the past and present, practised this model of election. Many countries in Europe have specifically designed their electoral practices on this model owing to distinctive complexities at their respective local level. The major cause for shifting to this model is political, social and financial. Despite being the single structured election method for the entire country, simultaneous elections are not uniform throughout. It has various models, and each model represents its own uniqueness.

Schakel and Dandoy (2014) analyse 2,915 regional elections across 317 regions in 18 European countries (1945–2009) and find that the timing of elections significantly affects turnout. While analysing these datasets, they observed a trend in the parliamentary system in European countries where simultaneous elections have different models. They carefully observed and analysed the pattern and drew a conclusion that simultaneous elections are not uniform. Hence, they divided them into six categories (Chadah, 2024).



**Figure 1-Six models of simultaneous election propounded by Schakel, A. H., & Dandoy, R. in Electoral cycles and turnout in multilevel electoral systems.**

### 1. National, Provincial, and District/City simultaneity-

According to this concept, all national and regional (provincial and district/city) elections are held concurrently on the same day in a nation. These elections are held at all levels: province, district/city, national, and regional. Candidates for President and Vice President are elected concurrently with candidates for members of the House of Representatives, who possess the most authority, if the nation follows the presidential system of government. No other elections are scheduled.

**2. National and provincial simultaneity-** All provincial elections are held on the same polling day as the national elections under this concurrent paradigm. District-level elections, however, are held independently.

**3. Provincial and district/city simultaneity-** The goal of this simultaneous approach is to hold national elections at the same time as regional ones. This means that all regional general elections, provincial and district/city elections take place on the same day. National general elections, nevertheless, are held at a different period and are distinct from regional general elections.

**4. Provincial simultaneity-** According to this arrangement, all provincial elections, including those for the governor, who holds executive authority, and candidates for the legislature, are held concurrently at the federal level. According to this paradigm, many election days are used for both national and district/city elections.

**5. Regency/City simultaneity-** Even general elections held at the regional or local level exhibit simultaneity in this model. All of a province's cities and regions have elections at the same time. Each province's execution of various general elections will be impacted by this approach. Additionally, general elections are held at different times at the national and provincial levels.

**6. Another simultaneity-** The Simultaneous Elections model is designed to categorise nations that hold elections for the President and Members of the EU Parliament on the same election day using a sample of EU member states. Additionally, nations that hold simultaneous referendums on the same day are categorised using the model.

**Global Experiences of Simultaneous Election:** Many countries are practising a simultaneous election mechanism for their elections. Let us consider some examples of global practices.

**Indian Experience-** Elections for the Lok Sabha and state assemblies were held simultaneously in India from 1951–52 till 1967. Premature government dissolution, coalition instability, and the emergence of separate regional political movements disrupted the synchronised electoral cycle, leading to the end of this practice (Singh, 2025; Kanodia, 2024).

**USA Experience-** Perhaps the most well-researched example of simultaneous elections in a federal democracy is the United States. Simultaneous elections have a major psychological impact on voter behaviour, according to

Andersen's (2024) thorough research based on 20 years of American National Election Study survey data. Concurrent elections boost voter turnout, but they also have the "crowding out" effect, which means that voters pay far less attention to candidates with a lower profile, especially those running for the House of Representatives. According to the study, voters give lesser-known politicians worse ratings and show less familiarity with them during simultaneous elections, whereas more famous office candidates bypass these unfavourable outcomes (Andersen, 2024).

According to the 50 Shades of Federalism project, which explains how the Constitution provides the federal and state governments with overlapping authority in election management, the federal structure of the United States naturally produces differences in simultaneous elections. Although states have primary administrative responsibility, Article I, Section 4 gives Congress the authority to control elections "at any time," establishing full concurrent power between the nation and the state (50 Shades of Federalism, 2024). While synchronised elections would save costs, putting such a system into place would require significant changes to state election rules in each of the 50 states. The 2018 midterm elections cost \$5.2 billion (Sharma, 2024).

**Brazilian Experience-** One of the most effective large-scale examples of concurrent elections in a federal presidential system is Brazil. A notable paradox is revealed by Samuels' (2000) thorough empirical study of Brazilian simultaneous elections, where elections are time-synchronised ("married") and the outcomes frequently differ between levels ("divorced"). According to his research, state political agreements usually take precedence over national politics, even though they occur at the same time, and governorship candidates continue to have considerable independence from presidential elections. This result indicates that election coordination is significantly impacted by institutional architecture in addition to timing (Samuels, 2000).

Synchronous elections can effectively handle complex federal arrangements involving presidential, legislative, gubernatorial, and municipal positions, as demonstrated by the Brazilian model; nevertheless, this comes with a higher organisational cost. The study offers empirical proof that political coordination across levels of government is not always guaranteed by simultaneous elections in sizable federal democracies.

**Indonesian Experience-** Following Constitutional Court ruling No. 14/PUU-11/2013, Indonesia held its first simultaneous elections in 2019 that included presidential, national, and regional polls on the same day for around 200 million people (International IDEA, 2018). While studies in important provinces showed improved democracy indices and increased political participation (Saragih, Nasution, & Simarmata, 2021), they also pointed out "ballot complexity" issues, where voters had to handle multiple ballots,



increasing administrative burdens and fatigue (Tuanaya, Wance, & Muhtar, 2023). For India's multi-tiered system, the experience provides warning lessons on voter overflow and demonstrates large-scale viability.

**European Union: Experimental Synchronisation:** A thorough 2017 study of European electoral synchronisation by the Graduate Institute offers important new information about how synchronised elections affect governance and policy coordination. Positive effects on policy coordination were found in the study, which studied the "natural experiment" produced by the French and German national elections being held at random. For example, during the overlapping 4-5-year periods, newly elected French President Macron purposefully awaited the outcome of the German election before proposing policy alternatives for European discussions (Graduate Institute, 2017).

Three possible advantages of synchronised elections are highlighted by the European study: (1) greater political empowerment for citizens at the European level; (2) improved protection of the integrity of the electoral process; and (3) increased effectiveness in decision-making processes, particularly policy coordination among member states. The study does, however, caution that total synchronisation (all 27 nations) may result in "lame duck" periods six months before elections, leaving the government exposed in times of global crisis (Graduate Institute, 2017).

**German Experience-** Interesting lessons on simultaneous elections with constitutional protections can be learned from Germany's federal legislative system. The "constructive vote of no-confidence," a feature of the German model, guarantees political stability by mandating the establishment of an alternative administration before the dissolution of the present one. By avoiding early dissolution that upsets electoral cycles, this institutional mechanism increases the viability of synchronised elections in multiparty parliamentary settings (Chakraborty, 2024). Low degrees of vertical party integration, in which Land parties do not influence municipal party manifestos, result in decentralised political coordination, according to a recent study on German local politics. Municipal elections exhibit independence from federal electoral trends, demonstrating how decentralisation influences the impact of synchronised elections on various levels of governance (Gross & Jankowski, 2020; PMC, 2023).

**Swedish Experience-** A good example of full simultaneity is Sweden, which uses proportional representation to have municipal, regional, and national (Riksdag) elections all at the same time every four years. Although Sweden's relatively homogeneous society and smaller population (10 million) prevent direct comparability to large, diverse federal democracies like India, this system has achieved excellent administrative efficiency and voter engagement (Chakraborty, 2024). Full synchronisation is theoretically possible but necessitates particular institutional and social conditions, as the Swedish model demonstrates.

**South African Experience-** In South Africa, municipal elections are held independently, but national and provincial elections are held in tandem every five years. Since gaining universal suffrage in 1994, the African National Congress has dominated both the national and provincial levels (except for the Western Cape), emulating India's first 25 years of congressional victories across the country. Although the shift to more competitive politics may make such preparations more difficult, its dominance has made electoral synchronisation easier (Tribune India, 2024). According to South Africa's experience, synchronised elections might be more successful in environments with dominant party systems, but they would encounter difficulties as regional diversity and political competition grow.

**Countries with Limited Synchronisation:** According to thorough research published in 2024 by The Tribune India, simultaneous elections are "a rarity around the world" in federal parliamentary democracies. According to the 79th report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee, just two distinct cases from around the world, South Africa and Sweden, were found to apply to India's complex federal system, both of which have particular limitations (Tribune India, 2024). Despite exploring synchronised elections as a cost-cutting solution, Canada and Australia have chosen to prioritise federal authority over administrative efficiency by maintaining separate federal and provincial/state election seasons. Debates about electoral synchronisation are characterised by an agreement between efficiency and democratic representation, which these nations perfectly demonstrate.

Here, we have discussed some of the cases around the world reflecting their experiences of simultaneous elections. To sum up these things, a table is given below for comparative and feasibility analysis of the above-mentioned countries' experiences in the Indian context.

**Table1** (see in last page)

### Challenges in the Indian Context

**1. Political, Social, and Federal Structure of India:** India is a federal parliamentary democracy with a bicameral Parliament at the Centre and a mix of unicameral (22 states + 3 Union Territories) and bicameral (6 states) legislatures at the state level. Legislative terms for the Lok Sabha and state assemblies are fixed at five years under Articles 83(2) and 172(1) of the Constitution, with staggered election cycles resulting from variations in dissolution and mid-term polls (NITI Aayog, 2017).

**2. Diversity of Regional Parties and Electoral Implications:** According to McCoy (2013), regional parties hold 41% of Lok Sabha seats, which reflects India's diverse electorate and regional political aspirations. Given their centrality in coalition governments, it is important to remember that holding elections at the same time runs the risk of putting national campaigns ahead of state-specific ones, which could marginalise regional voices and policy

concerns.

**3. Constitutional and Legal Constraints:** To implement synchronised elections, a majority of states would need to ratify at least 15 constitutional reforms, including the introduction of Articles 82A (simultaneity) and 327 (powers of the State Election Commission). Reform can be challenging legally because of these intricate processes that protect India's basic structure doctrine (NITI Aayog, 2017).

**4. Public Opinion and Political Stakeholders' Perspectives:** According to a recent survey, 65% of people support "One Nation, One Election," citing cost savings and less voter fatigue (India Today, 2025). While opposition and regional parties caution about federal erosion and limited legislative responsibility, the ruling party places a strong emphasis on administrative efficiency.

#### Potential Benefits of ONOE

**Political Stability:** The potential to improve political stability is the primary advantage of One Nation One Election (ONOE). The Model Code of Conduct, which prohibits policy decisions during campaigns, is triggered by frequent elections, disrupting governance. Election synchronisation would allow state and Union governments to operate without frequent disruptions, resulting in more consistent policymaking. Coordinated elections with institutional safeguards can prevent premature dissolutions and promote continuity, according to international experience, such as Germany's constructive vote of no-confidence model (Chakraborty, 2024; Gross & Jankowski, 2020). Furthermore, academics and think tanks argue that fewer elections might result in better long-term planning and fewer interruptions to governance (Vaishnav, Mallory, & Richter, 2025; Chaudhary, 2025).

**Cost Minimization:** Separate elections for state assemblies and the Lok Sabha place enormous financial strain on the exchequer. The 2019 general elections were expected to cost around ₹ 60,000 crore, according to the Election Commission of India (Press Information Bureau, 2024). According to reports by PIB (2024) and NITI Aayog (2017), simultaneous elections might reduce the need for redundant security, personnel, and logistical deployment. Despite the logistical challenges, combining electoral cycles can result in significant savings, as demonstrated by comparative data from Indonesia's 2019 simultaneous election (International IDEA, 2018; Saragih, Nasution, & Simarmata, 2021).

**Administrative Efficiency:** The administrative machinery faces strain due to India's periodic election cycle, which causes teachers, civil personnel, and police to have to take time away from their normal responsibilities. These deployments would be streamlined by ONOE, allowing for better planning and continuous provision of public services. By reducing administrative disturbances, synchronising elections could strengthen governance, according to Yadav (2024). Additionally, Vision IAS (2025) highlights that

governments would be able to focus on welfare and development initiatives more regularly as a result of this consolidation.

**Reduction In Voter Fatigue:** According to recent studies, ONOE could improve voter engagement and reduce polarisation by simplifying the election schedule (Prakash, 2024). Voter fatigue and apathy are frequently caused in India by consecutive elections held at short intervals, particularly in lower-profile contests. Research conducted in the United States indicates that regular elections may lower participation in non-major races (Andersen, 2024). According to Rane and Nayak (2025), synchronising elections could improve overall participation, reduce repetitive mobilisation efforts, and increase election cycle predictability.

#### Associated Risks and Criticism

**Risks of Political Homogenization:** The possibility of political homogeneity, when national narratives predominate in state elections, is a significant critique of ONOE. Researchers contend that holding elections at the same time may overshadow local issues, causing state-level parties to focus their campaigns on national themes (Rane & Nayak, 2025). Research from the US shows that during simultaneous elections, voters frequently overlook local candidates and concerns in favour of more well-known national leaders (Andersen, 2024). Prakash (2024) cautions that ONOE might bolster majoritarian tendencies, diminishing the electoral room for minor regional parties and undermining India's pluralistic democracy.

**Threats to Federal Autonomy:** State autonomy is emphasised in India's federal framework, although the ONOE may compromise this idea. Concerns regarding democratic legitimacy would arise if it were necessary to either shorten or lengthen the term of some assemblies to align election cycles (Vaishnav, Mallory, & Richter, 2025). According to Chaudhary (2025), forced synchronisation carries the risk of acting against the federal balance principle outlined in the constitution, especially as state-specific governance concerns can become less visible when combined with national campaigns. This critique highlights how India's politics strike a careful balance between federalism and efficiency.

**Logistical Challenges and Electoral Integrity:** It would be extremely difficult to implement ONOE throughout a nation as big and diverse as India. Massive administrative capacity, such as double electronic voting machines (EVMs), voter verifiable paper audit trails (VVPATs), and security deployments, would be needed to synchronise elections for more than 900 million voters (Press Information Bureau, 2024). Complications are also shown by international experiences. For example, Indonesia's 2019 synchronised polls revealed that processing several votes on one day caused voter confusion, "ballot fatigue," and even logistical problems (Saragih, Nasution, & Simarmata, 2021). According to Yadav (2024), if large-scale

simultaneous voting in India is not planned carefully, it could lead to administrative overburden and compromise election integrity.

**Possible Political Resistance:** There are obstacles to ONOE's political viability as well. Opposition and regional parties worry that by coordinating campaigns with central narratives, simultaneous elections will favour powerful national parties disproportionately (Chaudhary, 2025; Vision IAS, 2025). Such synchronisation might tip the scales in favour of incumbents with widespread recognition, casting doubt on the impartiality of the democratic process, claims Prakash (2024). Furthermore, reaching a consensus would be a major challenge because the constitutional reforms needed for ONOE would need to be ratified by at least half of India's states (NITI Aayog, 2017).

**Strategic Framework for Implementation:** India's One Nation One Election (ONOE) implementation calls for a methodical, constitutionally consistent approach. Large-scale synchronisation can be supported by technological advancements such as modernising electronic voting machines (EVMs), improving voter verifiable paper audit trails (VVPATs), and implementing digital platforms for transparent election management (Press Information Bureau, 2024). According to NITI Aayog (2017), constitutional modifications will include new clauses protecting the federal balance as well as amendments to Articles 83 and 172 to align the provisions of the legislature. Before going national, policy frameworks should focus on implementing policies gradually and in phases, starting with aligning the Lok Sabha with a few state elections (Vision IAS, 2025).

To avoid early dissolutions from disrupting the synchronised cycle, precautions like Germany's constructive vote of no-confidence model could be adopted (Chakraborty, 2024). A wide-ranging political discussion, including all parties-national parties, regional parties, state governments, and civil society, remains essential to guaranteeing inclusivity (Vaishnav, Mallory, & Richter, 2025). A workable plan for deploying ONOE while preserving electoral variety and democratic integrity ultimately consists of a well-balanced structure that incorporates technological preparedness, constitutional amendments, gradual rollout, and institutional safeguards.

**Policy Implications and Recommendations:** Policymakers must take a balanced and inclusive stance if ONOE is going to be effective. Before a statewide introduction, a mock election model can assist in testing feasibility, starting with aligning Lok Sabha elections with a few state assemblies (NITI Aayog, 2017; Vision IAS, 2025). To guarantee legitimacy and agreement, a wide-ranging conversation with opposition parties, local authorities, and civil society is necessary (Vaishnav, Mallory, & Richter, 2025). To preserve democratic stability, institutional safeguards, such as procedures to avoid an early dissolution inspired by Germany's constructive vote of no-

confidence, should be taken into consideration (Chakraborty, 2024). To prevent national narratives from overshadowing local voices, changes must prioritise both cost-effectiveness and the preservation of India's federal variety (Chaudhary, 2025).

**In Conclusion:** One of the most ambitious electoral reform plans in the modern Indian democracy is the One Nation, One Election (ONOE) concept. Experiences in India and other countries have demonstrated its potential advantages, which include political stability, cost savings, administrative effectiveness, and a reduction in voter fatigue (Press Information Bureau, 2024; Andersen, 2024). By allowing administrations to focus more on governing rather than constant campaigning, synchronising electoral cycles could improve policy continuity and lessen financial strains (NITI Aayog, 2017; Chakraborty, 2024). Furthermore, the viability of widespread use is strengthened by the incorporation of cutting-edge electoral technologies, including modernised electronic voting machines and digital monitoring systems (Press Information Bureau, 2024). However, ONOE's criticisms draw attention to significant issues. There are still serious concerns of federal erosion, logistical overload, and political homogenization (Rane & Nayak, 2025; Prakash, 2024). While synchronisation is theoretically possible, it can have unforeseen repercussions like complicated ballots and confused voters, as evidenced by experiences from nations like Indonesia (Saragih, Nasution, & Simarmata, 2021).

Furthermore, in a diverse federation such as India, the synchronisation of electoral calendars may reduce regional voices, weaken the federal balance and compromise pluralism (Vaishnav, Mallory, & Richter, 2025; Chaudhary, 2025). The political viability of reform is further complicated by opposition party and regional stakeholder resistance, which makes reaching a consensus essential. Striking the right balance between ambition and practicality is necessary for the strategic road forward. A middle ground might be provided by a phased implementation strategy that starts with partial synchronisation and allows for institutional learning before widespread adoption (Vision IAS, 2025). To maintain stability, complementary constitutional protections must also be established, such as procedures to stop early dissolutions (Chakraborty, 2024). Crucially, the change should be presented as a democratic invention that promotes inclusivity and protects diversity rather than just as an administrative task.

In conclusion, ONOE is a complicated reform that calls for customised strategies rather than a one-size-fits-all approach. The ability of policymakers to balance stability with federal authority, innovation with constitutional integrity, and efficiency with democratic plurality will determine their success. To make sure that ONOE enhances rather than limits India's dynamic democracy, future studies must examine models of partial synchronisation, the use of technology to reduce logistical concerns, and frameworks



to safeguard regional representation.

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Country	Type of Government	Distinct Features of Simultaneous Elections	Relevance for the Indian Context
United States	Federal Presidential Republic	Federal and many state/local elections on the same day; 'ballot roll-off' effect where voters skip low-profile candidates; crowding out of House candidates during concurrent elections	Limited - demonstrates voter information overload and negative effects on lesser-known candidates; Indian multi-tier complexity would amplify these issues.
Brazil	Federal Presidential Republic	Presidential, legislative, governorship, and municipal offices synchronised; 'married' timing but 'divorced' results with state autonomy maintained	Highly Relevant - a large federal democracy successfully managing simultaneous elections while preserving state political autonomy; proves feasibility at scale.
Germany	Federal Parliamentary Republic	Parliamentary system with 'constructive vote of no-confidence' preventing premature dissolution; institutional safeguards ensure stability during synchronised cycles	Moderately Relevant - constitutional safeguards could prevent premature dissolution issues that disrupted India's original synchronised system (1951-1967)
Sweden	Unitary Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy	Complete simultaneity - national, regional, and municipal elections every 4 years using proportional representation; highest administrative efficiency	Limited - small homogeneous population and unitary system differ significantly from India's diversity and federal complexity.
South Africa	Unitary Parliamentary Republic	National and provincial elections are synchronised every 5 years; municipal elections are separate; the dominant party system facilitates coordination.	Moderately Relevant - shows synchronisation works with dominant party systems but may face challenges as political competition increases (relevant to India's evolving democracy)
Belgium	Federal Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchy	Federal and regional elections are aligned with the EU Parliament every 5 years; it manages linguistic federalism through coalition traditions.	Moderately Relevant - demonstrates successful management of linguistic/cultural diversity through established coalition practices.
Indonesia	Unitary Presidential Republic	Largest single-day election operation (200M voters) - presidential, parliamentary, and regional simultaneously; concerns about ballot complexity and voter fatigue	Highly Relevant - proves logistical feasibility for large populations; voter fatigue and ballot complexity concerns are directly applicable to the Indian scale.
European Union (France-Germany)	Supranational Union/Federal Parliamentary Republics	Natural experiment showing policy coordination benefits when major powers have synchronised terms; 4-5 year overlapping governance periods.	Moderately Relevant - shows potential for improved policy coordination between the centre and states during synchronised governance periods
Canada/Australia	Federal Parliamentary Constitutional Monarchies	Maintain separate federal and provincial/state cycles, prioritising federal autonomy over administrative efficiency.	Contrasting Model - prioritises federal principles over efficiency; represents an alternative approach India has considered but not adopted.

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